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The Constitutional Treaty Debates as Revelatory Mechanisms 
Insights for Public Sphere Research and Re-Launch Attempts 
 
Christoph O. Meyer, London, May 2007 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The European Union has manoeuvred itself into what some authors have called a 
‘constitutional trap’ (Diedrichs and Wessels, 2005). The French and Dutch No’s to the 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) in 2005 have cast fundamental doubts 
over the prospects of root and branch reform of a Treaty framework, which has been 
originally devised for a much different and much smaller community. As calls for greater 
participation of citizens have become ever louder, it will become increasingly more difficult 
to justify denying citizens a say on future amendments of the Treaty, not to mention a re-
launch of a Constitution-making process. Conversely, without a reform of the current 
framework it will be arguably hard to remedy some of the central problems, which have 
contributed to the erosion of the ‘permissive consensus’ on European integration in the 
first place. By this I mean the lack of direct democratic say over the appointment of key 
political personnel, the lack of accountability in the process of European governance, and 
last but not least, the problems for the increasingly larger Union to act effectively and 
coherently, especially but not only in area socio-economic welfare and competitiveness.  
I want to argue that a close analysis of public debates on the TCE is relevant to this 
problematique in at least two ways. First, it can help to reveal the overall level of information 
and publicity as well as the changing role of themes, issues and actors from the start of the 
Convention on the Future of Europe to the Decision to initiate a period of reflection after 
the referendum outcomes in France and Germany. This is arguably crucial to 
understanding the level of public awareness and knowledge about the TCE and why in the 
course of the debate public opinion became more opposed the TCE. Secondly, a detailed 
analysis of the debates across old and new EU member states is of direct relevance for 
normative as well as practical questions about whether or not to progress with or even re-
launch the constitutionalisation process. Without a minimum level of cross-national debate, 
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engagement of foreign actors in national public spheres and an orientation to a European 
interest, most theorists of democracy would question the legitimacy of aiming for a 
Constitution-like document in the first place. Analysing the degree and kind of 
Europeanization of public debates with regard to the TCE help us not only to confirm or 
modify the findings of some 15 years of European public sphere research and thereby 
provide a basis for providing empirically-grounded but normatively oriented policy on the 
future of the TCE.  
The main empirical basis for this chapter will be the results of an extensive media content 
analysis of ratification debates in six countries, which has been conducted by the members 
of the ConstEPS project at the Jean Monnet Chair at the University of Bremen (Liebert, 
forthcoming). I will relate these findings to previous insights from public sphere and media 
discourse research and explore how theses findings help to modify or challenge the existing 
‘state of the art’. I will argue that the findings are largely consistent with previous research, 
but that they highlight for the first time the particular problems affecting the quality and 
Europeanization of public debates in new EU member states from Central and Eastern 
Europe. New media coverage of the EU is affected by problems of a lack of 
professionalisation, training, resources and independence among journalists, a lack of 
interest in institutional and identity issues combined with a lack of knowledge about the 
EU, and concerns about a lack of say and status within the EU. Coming back to the initial 
question about the future of the TCE and a potential re-launch of the constitutional 
process, I will argue that such a re-launch would be premature for the foreseeable future, 
but that opportunity structures for European-wide voting on political representatives and 
issues need to be created to develop the potential for cross-national debates and increase 
citizens involvement in EU politics.  
 
2. The State of the Art in Public Sphere research – Is there “A” State of 
the Art? 
 
The past five years witnessed a surge in studies at different levels of scholarship focusing 
on the Europeanization of public discourses and public discourses (Hagen, 2003; Klein, et 
al., 2003; Koopmans, 2004a; Trenz, 2002; Meyer, 2002; Steeg, 2002; Eriksen, 2005; 
Langenbucher and Latzer, 2006). Most of the research was concerned in some way or 
another with the ‘communication deficit thesis’, i.e. whether the economic and political 
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integration has been matched by an increasing interpenetration, synchronisation and 
possibly convergence of national public discourses towards a European sphere of publics 
(Schlesinger, 1999) or a common communicative space (Eriksen, 2005); this is considered 
necessary from the perspective of cross-national identity formation, increasing cross-
national trust and allowing for opinion-formation about and scrutiny of European 
governance. The ability for cross-national opinion formation within a communication 
community is also considered as a precondition for a full-blown democratisation and 
constitutionalisation of the European Union as a state - if not nation-state like body 
(Grimm, 1995). Habermas himself emphasises an inverse causality, emphasis the 
importance of creating opportunity structures for debate and democratic practice, which 
will provide an impetus for an emergent public sphere at European or even transnational 
level   (Habermas, 1995). Given that empirical evidence for a Europeanization of public 
discourse was running far behind normative theories, a number of large research projects 
have set out to conduct large-scale quantitative and qualitative coding of media content 
(Koopmans, 2004a; Latzer and Sauerwein, 2006; Sifft, et al., 2007), usually of the press, but 
some also of television news and the internet (de Vreese, et al., 2001; Koopmans and 
Zimmermann, 2003).  
In their empirical inquiry, many of the key studies make the distinction between horizontal 
and vertical Europeanization (Koopmans, 2004a; Sifft, et al., 2007). Horizontal 
Europeanization of media discourses refers to an emergence and intensification of cross-
national debates about issues of collective concern, whereas vertical Europeanization 
focuses on debates - be they bottom-up or top-down – which involve EU actors and/or 
themes in national spheres. Sifft et al make the useful distinction between Europeanization 
as a trend or process, asking the ‘how fast’ question, as a quality (they call it level), asking 
the ‘how much/good’ question, and in terms of geographical scope, asking the ‘how far’ 
question (Sifft, et al., 2007). Until recently most of the public sphere research has been 
concentrated on snapshot situations or changes within a relatively short space of time.  
 
Horizontal Europeanization 
 
How is horizontal Europeanization measured in practice? In the context of the public 
sphere debate, it is not sufficient that the same topic is discussed at the same time with the 
same criteria of relevance as Eder and Kantner have argued (Eder and Kantner, 2000), but 
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there also needs to be discursive interaction (Steeg, 2002) or ‘reciprocal resonance 
structures’ (Tobler, 2001) between different national debates in order to speak about a 
Europeanization public discourse. However, without the yardstick of democracy theory, 
vertical Europeanization could be observed already if there are increasing references to 
foreign (EU) politicians, interest groups, or news media within national public discourse 
over time. Yet, the empirical findings from the longitudinal studies mentioned above 
suggest otherwise. Peters et al. (Peters, et al., 2005) have found that ‘[a]ll five national 
newspaper demonstrate either no clear pattern or even a slight decline over time in their 
attention to other European countries.’ Koopmans found that horizontal Europeanization 
trends were weak in the issue fields covered by the study (Koopmans, 2004b). Looking at 
the different issue areas this finding is perhaps not surprising given that many policy areas 
have been increasingly subject to European level regulations and coordination, so one 
would expect a degree of trade-off between horizontal and vertical Europeanization as a 
reflection of real shifts in political power and activity. In other words, the more attention 
the news media play to EU politics, the more they less they are interested in national 
politics of other countries. In acknowledging this redistribution of public attention, the 
Europub-Group also adopted an aggregate perspective and still found a net-increase in the 
Europeanization of public discourses as far as political claims are concerned.  
Even though one finds little empirical evidence for a significant increase in transnational 
debates at this aggregate level, case studies of different controversies ranging from tax 
policy (Tobler, 2001), Haider/Austrian elections (Steeg, 2004), to the accession of Turkey 
(Wimmel, 2004) indicate the potential for transnational communicative reciprocity and 
common discursive frames. Of course these are studies of carefully selected single cases, 
rather than of broad issue areas as in the previous longitudinal studies. Still, they do show 
that certain questions can become transnationally politicised and debated, especially when 
national politicians, and not EU-Commissioners, are at the heart of controversies as in the 
Tobler (Lafontaine) and the van de Steeg studies (Haider). Moreover, in the case of the 
Stability and Growth Pact my own studies have shown that national politicians are 
increasingly drawn into the coverage in so far as they are acknowledged as significant EU-
actors with conflicting goals (Meyer, 2005a). This personalisation can be quite problematic 
from the perspective of discourse ethics because both debates entailed a certain element of 
demonisation of these foreign national politicians (Haider and Lafontaine), which would 
have been unacceptable within national discourses. Generally, it seems that cross-national 
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debates are highly episodic and issue-dependent and, if they do occur, they are often very 
asymmetric in terms of who observes and reacts to whom. 
Another, probably less problematic dimension of horizontal Europeanization from the 
perspective of reform and policy effectiveness, is the moderate increase in cross-national 
comparisons on the economic performance of other EU countries (Meyer, 2005a). This 
means that national public discourses are increasingly comparing quantitative data and 
political evaluations of their own policy performance with those of other countries when 
debating these particular policies. Even though evidence of real learning across boundaries 
is still limited, we do see first indications of an emergent discourse in each country centring 
on its own competitiveness within Europe, and to regard its own ranking within Europe as 
an indicator of successful or failed policies. This is particularly true for those countries, 
which have a strong European orientation and are doing badly in relative terms such as 
Germany, Portugal and Italy. The increased availability of data on national policy 
performance means that opposition parties have found additional and potent ammunition 
against the government in the battle for public opinion. Of course, there are differences in 
the degree to which countries frame their policies in this way, but since every country is 
likely to be worse than the European average in some policy areas, the main phenomenon 
should not be limited to countries, whose economies are doing badly.   
 
Vertical Europeanization or EU-ization 
 
One way of investigating the vertical Europeanization phenomenon is to ask whether EU 
themes are more frequently and prominently covered over time in national media. Here, 
the findings of are moderately positive. My own research indicates that we have seen over 
the last ten years the emergence of a geographically and socially restricted public discourse 
in Brussels, revolving around particular elites, including Brussels-based journalists, who 
read similar publications and can and do engage in transnational debates, not always, but 
frequently enough to call it cohesive (Meyer, 2002). The number of accredited journalists 
working for EU 15 based news media has almost doubled between 1990 and 2002, from 
333 to 638. It is, however, striking that correspondent figures until about 2000 rose 
particularly strongly for North European countries (especially Germany, UK and 
Netherlands), whereas the figure for Southern European countries showed at best a slight 
increase (particularly for French and Spanish media) (Meyer, 2002).  
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At the aggregate level, however, the evolution of correspondent figures in Brussels testifies 
to the rising importance of Brussels on the national news agenda. With more resources the 
focus of EU coverage has changed and become more diverse. The typical Brussels story in 
the old days provided either very technical information or an anecdotal reflection of single 
market harmonisation, including the notorious straight bananas and square strawberries 
story. Today, Brussels is being continuously covered (except for the summer recess) and is 
making the headlines frequently. This is also reflected in my own longitudinal data based 
on a keyword-scanning analysis of headlines in quality newspapers in the UK, France and 
Germany. 
More sophisticated data from media content analysis have been generated by two major 
research projects coordinated in Bremen and Berlin (Peters, et al., 2005; Koopmans, 
2004b). They confirm and elaborate the general finding that EU-ization has clearly 
increased over time. The Bremen-Group examined newspaper coverage at various points 
in 1982, 1989, 1996 and 2004 and concluded that ‘we can observe a clear trend of 
Europeanization, as the percentage of articles referring to European institutions increases 
up to at least 20 % in four out of five newspapers. Overall, the appearances of the 
European Union, in general, and of the European Commission increased more than three 
times from 1982 to 2003, while the European Parliament remained at a relatively low level 
since 1989’ (Peters, et al., 2005). The Berlin/Europub-Group found in their claims-making 
study even stronger empirical support for what they call ‘vertical Europeanization’ trends, 
but noted substantial differences across policy-fields, less so than between countries 
(Koopmans, 2004b). So one can safely assume that media awareness of the EU has 
increased and with it the scope and depth of public discourses about political issues relating 
to the EU.  
Whether the degree of vertical Europeanization is sufficient or still inadequate if measured 
against the real importance of what is happening is a moot point, which cannot easily 
answered without some objective indicator of what real importance is (it is sometimes 
argued that at least 50 percent of all national laws today originate from the EU). Peters et 
al. argue on the basis of their longitudinal data that the coverage of EU politics as increased 
from 2 percent to 10 percent between the 1980s and 1990s, but remains still less prominent 
than the overall coverage of international affairs, and is furthermore in no position ‘to 
challenge the dominance of debates about domestic politics’ (Peters, et al., 2005). More 
importantly, however, for the purposes of our thesis is that media coverage has been in a 
catching up mode, namely that due to a number of inertia factors, vertical Europeanization 
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only set in with some delay after the momentous political decisions about the future 
evolution of the EU had been taken in 1987 and in 1991/2. We are therefore faced with an 
asynchronous Europeanization of media coverage in terms of the sheer level of publicity. 
 
3. Public Sphere Research and the Constitutionalisation Process: 
Lessons to be learnt 
 
The probably most interesting finding stems from research about the media coverage of 
processes leading to Treaty change (Liebert, forthcoming; Gleissner and de Vreese, 2005; 
Garry, et al., 2006; Packham, 2003; Kurpas, 2007). The evidence from the media coverage 
of the European convention indicate, firstly, that the higher expectations regarding the 
visibility of the Convention method have not been met in terms of the quantity and 
continuity of coverage across the whole process (Packham, 2003; Kurpas, 2007), secondly, 
that common European frames in coverage regarding the evolution of the EU and the 
TCE existed in the quality press amongst continental European states (Packham, 2003; 
Kurpas, 2007; Trenz, 2005), but, thirdly, that transnational debates were hardly developed 
(horizontal dimension) and cross-national conflict cleavages dominated issue-related 
debates linked to left-right cleavages for instance, particularly in the later phase of the 
Convention and the following IGC when governmental actors became more involved 
(Kurpas, 2007; Kurpas, et al., 2005). To some theorists of deliberative democracy such as 
John Dryzek (Dryzek, 2000) the relative lack of extensive public debate and its national 
focus do not necessarily constitute a problem as long as the deliberative process itself 
meets certain criteria. Indeed, the very absence of public scrutiny and potential for 
scandalisation inherent in media democracies can be considered a precondition for the real 
arguing and persuasion to take place. However, when it comes to adopting and ratifying the 
outcome of the deliberations, public debate takes centre-stage again and the questions 
posed about the qualities of these debates, including their level of Europeanization become 
crucial again.  
This is why the empirical focus of the Bremen ConstEPS project on the ratification debates 
in the printed press of selected member states is so necessary and important (Liebert, 
forthcoming). It provides systematic quantitative and qualitative evidence of the press 
debates about the constitutional treaty, going beyond traditional public sphere research by 
looking also actor constellations and argumentative strategies (Packham, forthcoming; 
Maatsch, forthcoming; Rakasanova, forthcoming; Wyrozumska, forthcoming; Evas, 
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forthcoming). A common coding scheme was developed and applied by a number of 
researchers from old and new member states. The focus on the debates in new EU 
member states is particularly valuable has it highlights the often overlooked issue of 
geographical scope and contributes to the debate about how far a European public sphere 
extends to countries frozen politically, culturally and economically for decades in the Soviet 
sphere of influence. In order to measure Europeanization of debates, ConstEPS uses the 
terms of vertical and horizontal Europeanization as other scholars from the Europub and 
the DFG-funded project did, but define them somewhat more narrowly than Sifft et al. 
(Sifft, et al., 2007). For instance, the definitions of segmented Europeanization as 
references to EU events, actors but exchanges limited to MS communication community 
(Liebert, forthcoming), would fall in previous studies under the term vertical 
Europeanization. Vertical synchronisation in turn is defined as synchronisation and 
convergence of MS communication communities as a result of top-down EU mechanisms. 
Synchronisation and convergence as such could be also the result of horizontal 
Europeanization processes, which is defined as ‘cross-boundary mutual observations 
among different communication communities’. Finally, the project adds two more 
dimensions: European transnationalisation and supranational Europeanization. The former 
is defined in terms of overlapping and interacting debates involving foreign 
(European/non-European?) speakers and arguments, while the later is defined in terms of 
discourses referring to a collective European identity. 
What are the key findings from the perspective of public sphere research and what can we 
learn from them? The case studies cover the period from fall 2004 to fall 2005 and take 
cases, which are very different in terms of the political process and context of ratification. 
France was going to hold a referendum on the Treaty, the UK government had promised 
one but campaigning had not yet started, the Czech Republic and Poland which agreed on 
ratification by referendum after some debate, but decided to postpone the referendum after 
the Dutch and French votes, and Estonia and Latvia which ratified by parliamentary assent. 
This makes only for one country with a clear cut referendum campaign comparable to the 
case of Ireland’s vote on the Nice Treaty (Garry, et al., 2006). In one country, the Czech 
Republic, the governmental campaign had just started and was then stopped, while in the 
other cases campaigning had not yet started or was limited to the fact that ratification was 
by parliamentary assent. Unsurprisingly the level of debate in the press varied substantially 
as far as the results from the key-word scanning approach indicate. While there is not 
break-down of the numbers per newspaper and questions about comparability in the 
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outcomes of key word-scanning across different types of media products, the sheer 
numbers do provide at least an indication of the salience of the issue in national spheres: 
the case of France generated 4071 articles, the Czech case 970, the UK 943 articles, the 
Polish 699 and the Latvia and Estonian cases about 350 (Liebert, forthcoming). The 
difficult question, as generally for other studies trying to assess the level of Europeanization 
of discourses, is to decide on adequate benchmarks for whether this is ‘little’ or ‘a lot’. An 
interesting dimension of comparison could be the level of coverage of the IGC or indeed 
the Convention on the future of Europe.  
Leaving the methodological problem of measuring salience aside, a qualitative reading of 
the chapters reveals that the coders characterised the French debate as very vigorous 
(Maatsch, forthcoming), while the Czech debate with a vocal and polarising TCE-sceptic 
President Klaus comes next (Rakasanova, forthcoming), closely followed by the UK 
(Packham, forthcoming), where both opposition and government were trying to keep a 
potentially explosive issue out of domestic politics as long as possible and despite 
campaigns of some media to the contrary. The Polish paper explicitly noted the low level 
of public debate and its elitist nature (Wyrozumska, forthcoming), a finding, which is 
generally shared by the study of the Baltic republics (Evas, forthcoming). This finding can 
in part be explained by variations in the political context (referendum-campaign vs 
parliamentary ratification) between the various countries. Previous research on 
Europeanization has revealed that the visibility of political conflict both within a state and 
between state, particularly between well-known political figures, is a key variable to explain 
salience. However, a second variable should be the immediacy, specificity and relevance of 
the issue at stake, which varied between countries in terms of immediacy given differences 
in time-tables for decisions, but the specificity and relevance should be similar as the 
Constitutional Text was the same. From this perspective, one may need to bring in other 
variable as well to explain why the overall level of debate in those countries apart from 
France was relatively low from the perspective of enabling citizens to form their own 
opinion about the TCE. 
At the same time, the overview paper of Liebert highlights some of positive aspects for the 
Europeanization/transnationalisation of discourses through ratification debates about the 
TCE (Liebert, forthcoming). The first positive aspect is that most of the debates, except 
for the French one, included a good deal of observation of other countries. This was 
particularly relevant for those countries, where the mode of ratification, parliamentary or 
direct voting, was publicly contested. This in turn gave rise to debates about the nature of 
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the TCE, to what extent it shifted competences to the EU and impacted on citizens’ lives 
and whether it was compatible with national constitutions. To decide this question some 
political actors thought to justify their position not only with reference to the actual text 
and politico-legal argument, but also by appealing to the pre-accession discourse of 
belonging to the European family: would having a referendum place the country inside or 
outside of the European mainstream (Rakasanova, forthcoming; Evas, forthcoming)? It is 
interesting to note how the debate about this later question shifted after the French and 
Dutch, which was criticised in the debate by TCE advocates and gave the sceptics a boost 
as it allowed them to be against the TCE and be ‘a good European’. Being against the 
Constitutional Treaty was no longer synonymous with being against European integration 
as the supporters of the TCE in the Czech Republic, Poland and the Estonia had argued. 
The studies find also a relatively high proportion of 30 to 44 percent of foreign nationals in 
the debates among the new Member State (frequency/prominence?), which seems to be a 
high figure. Only in France was the proportion substantially lower with 23 percent, which 
is consistent with the generally high-degree of self-centredness attributed to it by the case 
study. The case studies of the three new member states suggests that mentioning foreign 
nationals does equate necessarily to impact on domestic debates, except for the case of the 
Czech Republic were TCE-critical president Vaclav Klaus engaged in heated debates with 
both domestic and European actors. In contrast, the paper of Wyrozumska on the Polish 
case noted the lack of linkage between the coverage of EU summit policy and foreign 
leaders’ statements and the specific concerns expressed in the domestic debate 
(Wyrozumska, forthcoming). In the cases of Latvia and Estonia, the debates were of low 
intensity and salience, and the elitist bias evidenced by legal arguments about the 
compatibility of TCE and national constitutions.  
The high proportion of foreign actors cited in public debates contrasts with findings of 
public sphere research regarding relatively low levels of horizontal Europeanization during 
routine periods of EU politics (Sifft, et al., 2007). However, it is quite compatible with other 
studies of transnational interactions, probably even more interactive than in this case, 
which show that certain crises and issues are conducive to higher levels of transnational 
discursive interactions as Tobler (Tobler, 2002) and Wimmel (Wimmel, 2004) have already 
shown. The ConstEPS finding do also seem to corroborate the existence of asymmetries in 
mutual observation and communicative interaction between countries (Tobler, 2001; 2002) 
and is compatible with expectations that smaller and less influential countries are much 
more interested in the political decisions and indeed debates in larger more influential 
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countries than vice-versa. An additional explanation for this asymmetry may be that 
Eastern enlargement itself had been a contentious issue in old member states, not least in 
the context of findings that public voting in EU referendums can in part be predicted by 
fears of immigration (de Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2005). Fears regarding the migration of 
labour from East to West, however unfounded, were linked in the French debate to the 
second and even more salient issue about how the TCE enshrined a neo-liberal order with 
perceived negative impacts across a range of sectors, not just for French plumbers 
(Maatsch, forthcoming). 
The ConstEPS findings are thus in many ways compatible with key findings of previous 
studies of the European public sphere and the Europeanization of public discourses. It 
confirms the significance of different kinds of opportunity structures for public 
participation, the key role of prominent political actors and cross-party conflict over 
Europe, and the high inertia against transnational and issue-focused debates.  With regard 
to opportunity structures, the case of France demonstrates that referenda on Treaty 
changes can be an impetus for vigorous domestic debate about European issues, but they 
are by now means a guarantee that these issues are discussed in a way that gives space to 
European voices and speakers and that ensures transnational debates. Perhaps the most 
significant findings of the research is how the French vote changed the path of the 
constitutional debates in other countries, most notably the Czech Republic and the UK, 
and thus demonstrated that the ratification of the TCE can also work as an impetus to 
transnational politicisation and Europeanization of media discourses. Once the TCE was 
cast into question, it became the stimulus to debates that might have been in many ways 
more appropriate during or immediately after the Convention on the Future of Europe. 
This raises serious questions about the role of public debate in the succession of 
deliberative, intergovernmental and ratification states, which will be explored further 
below. 
The other important insight of the ConstEPS projects concerns the differences between 
old and new member states as well as between the new member states. So far, most of the 
public research has focused on the EU-15 and has not analysed debates in the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe. The generally lower level of public debate about the TCE, its 
elitist bias with a strong dependence on individual political actors or commentators, the 
lack of linkage between foreign and domestic news coverage indicates that the context 
variable for media coverage of the EU in the new member states are quite different from 
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those in the EU-15. In this context, I would argue that the Czech is the exception rather 
than the rule.  
One important factor to explain the relatively low-key and elitist bias is that EU-related 
news until 2004 was narrowly focused on the issue of each countries accession to the EU, 
meaning either a highly technical and direct focus on the implications of adopting the 
acquit and meeting EU demands with the consensual normative frame of wanting to 
belong to the European family again by joining the EU (however misguided this idea). The 
linkage between accession and the TCE debates was noted by a number of papers. Looking 
more generally closely at the role of the news media in the new member states, a study by 
Sophie Lecheler of Brussels Correspondents from New Member States  (Lecheler, 2006) 
shows how a combination of resource scarcity, limitations of space, and low levels of 
knowledge among copy-editors and readership impede a continuous and detailed coverage 
of the EU considerable more than for journalists from the EU-15. The 
audience/readership in the new EU-12 has generally very little interest in questions of 
institutional design and European identity, a regular topic for the German, French and 
British quality press, but is considerably more focused on bread-and-butter issues with 
direct effect. The legacy of the media coverage of the accession process is thus that there 
was a low level of awareness about the scope of EU activity and its identity dimension. 
Journalists found it hard to explain how the TCE issue was different from the debate about 
accession. 
Moreover, the media structure in new member states and journalistic training and standards 
are some ways still in the process of transition in many of the newly acceded countries. 
There are relatively fewer national quality papers and public broadcasters, which are known 
to carry more and better EU news. Instead the media landscape is characterised by intense 
and relatively fluent competition, driven in part by foreign owners’ narrowly commercial 
interests, and high levels of dependency among the younger journalists on post-communist 
journalists turned proprietors. Moreover, the post-1990s generation is more involved in 
news production, whereas the older generation is often setting the tone of commentaries 
and analysis without knowing much about how the EU works. The Polish paper notes a 
number of inaccuracies and distortions in analytical and commentary pieces, which reveal 
not only a strong Eurosceptic bias but also unusual levels of ignorance even for UK 
standards (Wyrozumska, forthcoming). Even though and perhaps because public opinion 
in many of the new EU-12 has been broadly supportive of the TCE and links it logically to 
having said yet to accession, there has been relatively little debate, except for the Czech 
  - 15 -
case. Hence, the news media in the new EU-12 appear badly equipped, both in terms of 
resources, expertise and journalistic norms, to interpret a complex issue such as the TCE in 
terms of what the different parts and provisions really mean and what is genuinely new 
rather than just reformulated or renumbered.  
Ironically, this may have worked to the advantage of TCE supporters. Despite a lack of 
information and opinion formation, public opinion here is still prepared to give the EU the 
benefit of the doubt. This is in marked contrast to the Netherlands, for instance, where the 
lack of information about the issues at stake in the referendum was the most important 
reason for those who voted No according to the post-referendum opinion poll 
(Eurobarometer, 2005a). The lack of information is by no means new in the history of 
European integration, but mediatisation and politicisation mean that the Lindberg’s 
permissive consensus has been eroded in the EU-15 at a much faster pace than in the 
newly acceding member states: The principle of ‘When in doubt, say No’ can be expected 
to spread to the new EU-12 in the coming years as there is no reason to expect them to be 
isolated from the mediatisation and politicisation trends so prevalent in the old member 
states. The swing may be even more violent and rapid than in the old member states given 
the problems regarding the aforementioned factors affecting the quality, diversity and 
continuity of EU coverage in these states. 
 
Learning lessons for the future of the TCE: Business-as-Usual, Re-
launch or Revolution? 
 
What can the findings of public sphere research in general and ConstEPS in particular tell 
us about the future of the TCE? At first glance, one could question whether there is any 
significance whatsoever. The history of European integration is replete with crises, false 
starts, and temporary paralysis after governments’ had cast vetoes and negative referenda 
had blocked the ratification of Treaty amendments. So, one could argue that the crisis-
rhetoric is overdrawn and one could go back to ‘integration business as usual’, i.e. wait for 
economic and political circumstances to change, add-in a few symbolic compromises to the 
text of the TCE and give the French and Dutch an opportunity to change their views just 
as the Irish and Danish have done in the past. However, the clear No votes by two rather 
large and traditionally quite Europhile electorates indicates that business-as-usual will not 
work. More importantly, media content and public opinion research suggests that the 
current crisis is related to the maturation of long-term trends of what I call asynchronous 
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mediatisation and politicisation of EU politics, rather than one-off events that could be 
explained with reference to situational factors and peculiarities of each case.  
Despite strong arguments to differentiate between both cases, particularly regarding the 
intensity with which the debate was conducted (high in France, little and late in the 
Netherlands), the post-referendum analysis by the Commission’s Eurobarometer series also 
suggests that there is an important commonality (Eurobarometer, 2005a; b): Few of the 
citizens were motivated by concerns related to any particular provisions of the constitution, 
but were concerned by Eurosceptic macro-issues such as in the Netherlands (loss of 
sovereignty, identity) or indeed the neo-liberal bias of European integration in general (the 
Left in France). Both of these issues are long-standing in nature since the Single European 
Act and Maastricht were in no significant altered by the TCE. Neither did the provisions of 
the TCE affect in a significant way the distribution of competences, the decision-making 
rules or the scope and goals of socio-economic policies.  Other particular concerns in the 
referendum campaigns in the Netherlands and France were more specific, but also 
retrospective in nature such as the questions of CEEC Enlargement, Turkey’s candidate 
status and the joining of EMU (at too high an exchange-rate, NL). In a rare feat of 
successful scientific prediction Claes de Vreese argued that citizens would reject the Treaty 
if there were high levels of anti-immigration sentiments, pessimistic economic out-looks, 
and/or unpopularity of a government (De Vreese, 2004).  
One way of interpreting these findings is that the content of the Constitutional Treaty and 
possibly even any conceivable constitution do not really matter currently for understanding 
public debates and referendum outcomes concerning it. The debates are easily high-jacked 
by, I would argue, the dead-weight of the integration Past and multiple dissatisfactions of 
the Present. I would thus interpret the debates and referendum outcomes in France and the 
Netherlands at least in part as an opportunity for citizens to express their dissatisfaction 
about past Treaty amendments and the way in which they were passed with little visibility 
and domestic consultation in most member states (except in Britain were the EU has been 
politicised for a long time). As argued above, the asynchronicity of European integration 
and public debate has led with some delay to a mediatisation and politicisation of European 
politics as witnessed in the empirical evidence of vertical Europeanization of media 
discourse. The increase in ‘monitoring European governance’ (Sifft, et al., 2007) has 
contributed to eroding the permissive consensus on European integration and has given 
way to a wide-spread lack of trust among the EU-15 in political elites as far as European 
integration is concerned. Hence, ‘when in doubt say “No”’. This means also that 
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‘constructive ambiguity’ inherent in EU primary law and declaratory politics, which has 
often paved the way for compromises in the past does not work any longer. Ambiguous 
and multiple-use hybrids such as the TCE do not sell in referenda. Only if the TCE had a 
clear identity and unique marketing point would it be possible to communicate it 
effectively. The dilemma is that such a document is increasingly difficult to agree on in a 
Union of the 27. Hence the appeal of Sarkozy’s proposal to depoliticise the process and go 
back to a mini-Treaty comprising the generally accepted provisions. 
The second important finding of public sphere research relates to the limitations of 
horizontal Europeanization. While the ConstEPS project does show that there is 
observation of foreign speakers, it’s the political context and incentives for such 
observations, which is decisive. There was relatively little cross-national debate before the 
French referendum campaign started and public opinion began to shift. The intense 
observation of foreign speakers in other countries is only logical given that the TCE can 
only come into force if all countries ratify. The public debates in France themselves were 
hardly an example of embeddedness in transnational debates (Maatsch, forthcoming). 
Hence, it seems clear that the deficits with regard to horizontal Europeanization, in 
particular affecting the larger EU countries hinders citizens from seeing the shortcomings 
of their own government’s performance in terms of negotiated outcomes in a comparative 
perspective and thus better understand how certain EU decisions and in particular Treaty 
amendments are compromises and are necessarily not in all respects beneficial to everyone 
involved (Kurpas, et al., 2005). The negative reaction in many of the new member states to 
the French No only underlines the strong perception that the TCE should not bee seen as 
a solely national affair and that French voters can be accused to that extent for acting 
selfishly. As long as national events with a European dimension are covered by the media 
in this way, national referenda on EU Treaty amendments will become increasingly difficult 
to win, especially in a European Union of 27 at a time when the most Eurosceptic 
countries had not even voted on the TCE. European public sphere research shows that 
media coverage often follows opportunities to make political choices and that referenda are 
much more intensely covered than parliamentary ratifications of Treaty amendments, and 
for that matter, European Parliament elections.  
What can we learn for the future of the TCE? There are, as always short, medium and 
long-term recommendations. The short-term realistic one is that under the current 
conditions a re-launch attempt, even for an in multiple ways improved constitutional treaty 
is futile. If one worries about the legitimacy of the EU, one should concentrate on helping 
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it contribute to the solution of problems, i.e. focus on improving its output-legitimacy. In 
so far as this arguable requires a reform of the cumbersome and veto-prone Nice voting 
rules, a de-politicised Treaty amendment with standard parliamentary ratification should be 
pursued. It could bring in the TCE solution to reforming QMV as well as new provisions 
for flexible integration and pioneer-groups. In order to avoid the charge of circumventing 
citizens will (which is somewhat spurious given that only two-out of 27 countries have said 
No), one should avoid the temptation of extending QMV to new policy areas or bringing 
in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. What one could do, however, is using the Treaty 
amendment to provide more opportunities for citizens to express their views on European 
issues in order to avoid the ‘fait accomplit-syndrome’ and allow for the personalisation of 
EP elections (with candidates standing for Commission president) and the Europeanization 
of national elections. One would also need to rethink the conditions under which the EP 
could be given the right of legislative initiative as well as allowing for European-wide 
referenda on carefully defined issues or in response to high-threshold citizens petitions. 
This would in the medium term ease the pressure on Treaty/constitution referenda to be 
turned into scapegoats for the sins of the past. In the long-term, the European Union and 
its citizens do need and deserve a constitution. However, such a document should not be a 
hybrid such as the TCE but in all respects significant respects a constitution with strong-
selling points, including possibly direct elections of the Commission President. In order to 
stimulate serious and cross-national debates the rules need to be changed in at least two-
ways. First, the Referenda need to be held at the same time and supported by cross-
national campaigning platforms/structures (Meyer, 2005b), and second, a super-QMV 
needs to introduced as suggested by Andrew Duff (Kurpas and Micossi 2007: 6), together 
with credible and workable options for those countries who say ‘No’. 
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